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THE POLITICS OF OBAMACARE:  
HEALTH CARE, MONEY, AND IDEOLOGY 
Richard Kirsch* 
I.  ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF POLITICAL CONTROVERSY 
A recent article in The New Yorker on the origins of the campaign 
consulting business provided a fresh reminder—not that one was needed—
of how the politics of health care and the politics of politics in the United 
States are intertwined.1  The Lie Factory described how one of the earliest 
efforts, by the first two political campaign consultants, was to defeat a 1942 
proposal by California Governor Earl Warren to establish a state-run 
program of health coverage for all of the state’s residents.2 
For some one hundred years, there has been no more fertile political 
ground on which to play on people’s fear of change than health care.  As I 
write in my book, Fighting for Our Health:  The Epic Battle To Make 
Health Care a Right in the United States: 
The reason that health care reform keeps rising to the top of the political 
agenda, no matter how often it goes down in flames, is that people deeply 
care about health care.  When we meet an old friend, we often ask, “How 
have you been?  How is your family?”  If things are going badly, we may 
repeat the old adage, “At least I have my health.”  We vow to stick with 
our betrothed “in sickness and in health.”3 
So when we have to pay more to hang on to shrinking health coverage, 
when we can’t retire early or switch jobs or start a small business because 
we might lose our health insurance, when a serious illness threatens to drive 
us into bankruptcy, we demand that our political leaders do something!  But 
when we care about something so deeply, change can also be terrifying.  
Specific solutions prompt people to ask, how will that change affect me?  
Will I be worse off than I am now?  What will I lose? 
The seeds of defeat of health reform in the past have been planted and 
cultivated in this fertile ground by opponents of reform motivated by money 
and ideology.  They have understood, since the first debates around 
“compulsory health insurance” in the early 1900s, that they could defeat 
reform by frightening people about proposals for change.  Fear could turn 
 
*  Senior Fellow, Roosevelt Institute. 
 1. Jill Lepore, The Lie Factory, NEW YORKER, Sept. 24, 2012, at 50. 
 2. See id. at 56–58. 
 3. RICHARD KIRSCH, FIGHTING FOR OUR HEALTH:  THE EPIC BATTLE TO MAKE HEALTH 
CARE A RIGHT IN THE UNITED STATES 31–32 (2012). 
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consensus on the need to do something into paralysis.  In short, as the title 
of that chapter in my book says, when it comes to getting comprehensive 
health care reform in the United States, “the solution is the problem.”4 
A brief review of the history of reform illuminates the continuing 
struggle around the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (ACA) in March 2010,5 and how those history lessons were 
instrumental in the law’s historic passage.  While the American Medical 
Association (AMA) supported “compulsory health insurance” when it first 
became a public issue in 1912,6 by 1920 pressure from their membership—
many of whom feared that government mandated insurance would threaten 
their income—moved the AMA into opposition.7  A decade later, the AMA 
used ideology to combat President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s plans to include 
health care with retirement as part of what was to become Social Security.8  
Just after FDR was elected in 1932, the Journal of the American Medical 
Association (JAMA), attacked compulsory insurance as socialism: 
The alignment is clear—on the one side the forces representing the great 
foundations, public health officialdom, social theory—even socialism and 
communism—inciting to revolution; on the other side, the organized 
medical profession of this country urging an orderly evolution guided by 
controlled experimentation which will observe the principles that have 
been found through the centuries to be necessary to the sound practice of 
medicine.9 
After Harry Truman was elected in 1948 on a pledge to push for 
“national, compulsory health insurance,” the AMA hired the California 
campaign consultants who had defeated the Warren plan to work their 
magic on Truman’s proposal.10  They launched the “National Education 
Campaign,” which included full-page ads, radio commercials warning of 
the dangers of socialized medicine, and won the endorsement of more than 
1,800 private organizations for “voluntarism as the American way.”11  
Doctors became the leading organizers of the campaign, hanging 65,000 
posters in their offices of a country doctor with the caption, “Keep Politics 
 
 4. Id. at 25. 
 5. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (to be codified primarily in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).   
 6. See Kimberley Green Weathers, Fitting an Elephant Through a Keyhole:  America’s 
Struggle with National Health Insurance in the Twentieth Century 26, 40–41 (May 2004) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Houston) (on file with the Fordham Law 
Review). 
 7. See id. at 45–46. 
 8. KIRSCH, supra note 3, at 26. 
 9. See EMPLOYMENT AND HEALTH BENEFITS:  A CONNECTION AT RISK 63 (Marilyn J. 
Field & Harold T. Shapiro eds., 1993) (quoting an editorial by Morris Fishbein, editor of 
JAMA). 
 10. See Dan Diamond, How Political Consultants Defeated Health Reform, Again and 
Again, FORBES (Oct. 15, 2012, 10:10 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/dandiamond/2012/
10/15/how-political-consultants-defeated-health-reform-again-and-again. 
 11. Weathers, supra note 6, at 125. 
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Out of This Picture!”12  The AMA’s women’s auxiliary and other groups of 
health providers, including dentists, pharmacists, and nurses, delivered 
some 55 million pamphlets that included a made-up quote that the 
consultants attributed to Lenin, “Socialized medicine is the keystone to the 
arch of the Socialist State.”13  That concocted quote made its way into 
newspaper editorials around the country and was repeated as recently as 
2000 by the president of the conservative Association of American 
Physicians and Surgeons.14 
The AMA failed to stop President Lyndon Johnson from establishing 
Medicare as a national health insurance program for seniors, but not for 
lack of trying.  The AMA set up a front group called Operation Coffeecup 
and recruited actor Ronald Reagan to cut a record titled, Ronald Reagan 
Speaks Out Against SOCIALIZED MEDICINE, in which the future 
President says that Medicare would be the foot in the door for a totalitarian 
takeover.15  Almost half a century later, Sarah Palin quoted Reagan’s words 
during her speech accepting the Republican nomination for Vice-
President.16 
While the AMA was not able to stop the passage of Medicare, it did 
prevail on Congress to block the new law from setting the fees the 
government would charge for physician services, enshrining the fee-for-
service payment system into the law, a major driver of higher health care 
spending to this day.  By the time of Medicare’s passage in 1965, the 
modern health era of health care was in full bloom, as medical advances had 
made it possible to cure disease and lengthen life.  As incomes rose, so did 
health care consumption.  But during the first part of the twentieth century, 
other developed countries had instituted government-regulated systems, 
which provided access to affordable health care to all citizens.  Health care 
in these nations was viewed as a public good, not a market commodity.  
The countries developed a variety of mechanisms to control the price and 
supply of health care, while assuring that all citizens had affordable 
coverage.  As a result, health care spending rose with national incomes but 
without becoming a huge burden on citizens or business.17 
By contrast, the United States continued its amalgamation of employer-
provided health coverage and government provided health coverage through 
Medicare (for seniors and people with severe disabilities) and Medicaid (for 
 
 12. Id. at 126. 
 13. See id. at 125; Lepore, supra note 1, at 57. 
 14. See Lawrence R. Huntoon, Universal Health Coverage—Call It Socialized Medicine, 
5 MED. SENTINEL 134, 136 (2000) (“Lenin once said that ‘medicine is the keystone in the 
arch of socialism,’ and I believe those who are promoting ‘universal coverage’ via 
government-run and government-controlled medicine know this.”), available at 
http://www.haciendapub.com/medicalsentinel/universal-health-coverage-call-it-socialized-
medicine. 
 15. See Max J. Skidmore, Ronald Regan and “Operation Coffeecup”:  A Hidden 
Episode in American Political History, 12 J. AM. CULTURE 89 (1989). 
 16. See WENDELL POTTER, DEADLY SPIN 81 (2010). 
 17. See OECD Health Data 2012:  How Does the United States Compare, OECD (June 
2012), http://www.oecd.org/unitedstates/BriefingNoteUSA2012.pdf. 
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the poor), which was also enacted in 1965.  Without a national mechanism 
to control the increase in health care costs, over the next two decades health 
care came to claim a much greater share of the national economy, compared 
with other developed nations.18  Consumers and employers paid escalating 
health insurance premiums, and by the mid-1980s seniors were paying more 
out of pocket for health coverage than before Medicare’s implementation.  
At the same time, the growth of the low-wage service sector, in which jobs 
often did not come with health coverage, combined with the loss of 
manufacturing jobs, began to erode employer-based coverage. 
The growing pressures on the health care system created the political 
conditions for President Bill Clinton to make health care a central promise 
of his 1992 election campaign and the centerpiece of his legislative 
agenda.19  It also convinced many industry players, including the AMA, the 
American Hospital Association, and the trade association representing 
large, nonprofit health insurance companies, to support some sort of 
comprehensive change, which they viewed as inevitable.20 
The twin scourges of money and ideology reemerged as the debate over 
the Clinton proposals took off.  First Lady Hillary Clinton, charged by her 
husband to develop his health care plan, involved a host of industry players 
in her deliberations and tried to accommodate their needs.  But the massive 
changes proposed in the Clinton plan still raised many concerns in the 
health industry, which they in turn raised with members of Congress.  A 
breakaway group of smaller, for-profit health insurers under the banner of 
the Health Insurance Association of America had no reservations about 
taking their alarm at the Clinton plan to the public.21  Their famous Harry 
and Louise TV ads scared the public with an ideologically based message, 
attacking “mandatory government health alliances” and government 
bureaucrats.22 
Ideology took a highly partisan form in 1994, as Newt Gingrich lead the 
effort to defeat any health care legislation, correctly betting that the 
rejection would pave the way for the emerging new right of the Republican 
Party to take control of the House of Representatives.23  While more 
moderate Republican senators like Rhode Island’s John Chafee and Senate 
Minority Leader Bob Dole of Kansas were willing to entertain a 
compromise with Clinton on reform, Gingrich poisoned the well and was 
rewarded by becoming Speaker of the House in 1995. 
Despite the political disaster of the Clinton health reform experience, by 
the mid-2000s, the rising cost pressures on consumers, business and 
government, and the growing number of uninsured Americans, began to 
bring comprehensive health reform back to the political agenda.  One 
 
 18. See id. 
 19. KIRSCH, supra note 3, at 27. 
 20. Id. at 28. 
 21. See id. 
 22. See id. 
 23. See id. at 29–30. 
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reason that reformers finally prevailed in 2010 is that many of them, like 
myself, had lived through and learned the lessons of 1994.  Advocates for 
reform outside of government, key members of Congress and their staffs, 
and advisors to the Obama Administration implemented a strategy that 
addressed the failures of the previous decade.  In the following, I review the 
main components of that strategy. 
II.  STRATEGIC LESSONS FOR THE 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT’S IMPLEMENTATION 
Strategic Lesson One:  An Acceptable Policy Approach.  By 2008, 
reformers were committed to proposals designed to meet their central policy 
goals with minimal disruptions to the existing health care system.  The 
objective was to appeal to two audiences.  The first was the health care 
industry, aiming to win the support of major industry players and avoid the 
industry-financed opposition that killed the previous efforts.  The second 
audience was the public, with reforms aimed at addressing people’s biggest 
worries while avoiding changes to the financing arrangements that provided 
health coverage to 85 percent of the nation’s residents. 
The model for this approach to national reform was developed in 
Massachusetts, where it was enacted in 2006.  The first decision that 
Massachusetts advocates—including health care consumers, labor unions, 
hospitals, and doctors—made was to focus on the goal of covering all of the 
state’s residents, rather than controlling costs.  Reformers intentionally 
borrowed from conservative and liberal ideas, coming up with an approach 
that would appeal to Republican Governor Mitt Romney and the large 
Democratic majority in the legislature. 
The framework they developed, which became law, built on the four 
pillars of the current health care coverage system:  employer provided 
coverage, Medicaid, Medicare, and individually purchased insurance.  
Massachusetts encouraged employers to continue to provide coverage by 
placing a small fine (too small to generate political opposition) on larger 
employers that did not provide coverage.  It increased Medicaid eligibility 
(and the federal/state child health insurance program) to cover more adults 
and children above the poverty level.  (It did not touch Medicare, a federal 
program.)  These are all liberal ideas, which also gave more customers to 
health care providers and insurers without disrupting payment 
arrangements. 
The important innovation—where conservative and liberal policies were 
blended—was in the individual market.  Here an idea promoted by the 
conservative Heritage Foundation,24 requiring individuals to purchase 
coverage and making coverage available from a health insurance 
marketplace, was made acceptable to liberals by providing income-based 
 
 24. See Avik Roy, The Tortuous History of Conservatives and the Individual Mandate, 
FORBES (Feb. 7, 2012 3:32 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/aroy/2012/02/07/the-tortuous-
conservative-history-of-the-individual-mandate/. 
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subsidies to individuals to purchase coverage and regulating the new 
market.  The regulations included establishing set benefit plans, limiting 
entry to plans that met quality and cost standards, and continuing insurance 
reforms that were already in place in Massachusetts, including bans on 
denying coverage due to a preexisting condition or charging people higher 
premiums because of their medical history. 
The Massachusetts framework appealed to all of the major 
constituencies.  Consumer groups saw that individuals would have access to 
affordable coverage.  Health insurers got new customers, and hospitals 
would get more patients and fewer uninsured for whom to care.  From the 
public’s point of view, the only change would be positive:  affordable 
coverage if you did not get health insurance at work. 
The one constituency that was not happy with the Massachusetts policy 
were the champions of public health insurance, known as “single-payer,” 
because, under this approach, everyone is insured by one government-run 
insurance plan.  Proponents of single-payer often framed it as extending 
Medicare for all, which would have been the most obvious way to 
implement it at the national level and was touted as a message that built on 
Medicare’s popularity. 
Single-payer advocates made up a significant force in the health reform 
movement, whose support would be crucial to winning comprehensive 
reforms nationally.  In fact, the health reform movement had been divided 
for decades about how much to insist on reforms based on national health 
insurance and how much to work within the current, multipayer U.S. health 
care system.  Those divides made it very difficult to build a unified 
campaign that would organize support for reform and fight the strenuous 
opposition to actual legislation. 
But single-payer policy suffered from a deep political flaw; it violated the 
“change as little as possible” rule, because the 150 million people with 
employer-based coverage would have to give that up for government 
insurance.  It would provide a great target for opponents who wanted to 
scare people about change. 
The solution to bridging the gap among health reform advocates while 
appealing to the public was another policy innovation, which came to be 
known as the “public option” during the legislative campaign to pass 
legislation in 2009.  I came up with the idea for the public option in 2003, 
when in writing a history of the Clinton effort, I realized that providing a 
choice between the two competing reform visions (the other being working 
within the multipayer system) could provide a bridge.25  Independently, 
 
 25. See RICHARD KIRSCH, WILL IT BE DÉJÀ VU ALL OVER AGAIN?  RENEWING THE FIGHT 
FOR HEALTH CARE FOR ALL (Mar. 2003), available at http://www.fightingforour
health.com/chapter/1-3/documents/2-Deja_Vu_Final.pdf. 
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Yale professor Jacob Hacker came up with almost the same concept in 
2001.26 
The ideal behind the public option was to offer a choice of a national 
health insurance plans to compete with regulated private insurance.  The 
proposal appealed to most of the progressive health reform movement, 
although not all.  It proved to have great appeal to many single-payer 
activists, who participated fully in rallies and events to support health 
reform legislation in 2009 and 2010.  In fact, it became the cause célèbre 
that kept progressive activists behind health care reform through most of the 
legislative campaign.  And despite continual attacks against the public 
option from conservatives and the health insurance industry, it maintained 
its popularity with the public, which liked being able to choose between 
regulated private insurance or a public plan. 
Strategic Lesson Two:  Win or Neutralize Industry Opposition.  While 
the public option was not favored by mainstream health care providers 
(doctors, hospitals, drug companies) and was abhorred by health insurers, 
the bulk of the proposal framework agreed to by Democrats in Congress 
and the Obama Administration—the Massachusetts approach—was 
acceptable.  The approach offered new customers under existing financing 
mechanisms.  Insurance companies were willing to offer insurance to 
people with preexisting conditions as long as the requirement to purchase 
coverage prevented the problem of people remaining uninsured until they 
needed medical care. 
A good deal of work went into encouraging the health industry to support 
reform, including a set of conversations before Obama’s election and a 
multistakeholder process run by Senator Ted Kennedy’s Senate Health, 
Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee. 
The White House and Senate Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus 
worked to formally line up support from key industry players, by 
negotiating industry specific trade-offs, under which an industry would 
agree to some changes in payments in return for two things:  the anticipated 
new customers as tens of millions more people became insured and no other 
reductions in revenues. 
The most important of these deals was with the prescription drug 
lobbying group, PhRMA.  Democrats agreed not to press for negotiating 
drug prices in Medicare and to oppose allowing importation of drugs from 
Canada, reversing two long-held positions.  In return, PhRMA agreed to 
reduce the prices it charged for drugs to seniors in the Medicare Part D 
prescription plan and to finance advertisements in support of the health care 
legislation.27  If no deal had been reached, PhRMA would have spent its 
$100 million on ads opposing the proposed law. 
 
 26. See JACOB S. HACKER, ECON. AND SOC. RESEARCH INST., MEDICARE PLUS:  
INCREASING HEALTH COVERAGE BY EXPANDING MEDICARE (2001), available at 
http://www.esresearch.org/RWJ11PDF/hacker.pdf. 
 27. See KIRSCH, supra note 3, at 135. 
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Negotiations with the AMA and the American Hospital Association also 
secured their support for the legislation.  The health insurance industry 
withheld opposition until the early fall, when the Senate reduced the 
penalties for individuals who did not get insurance, over the insurance 
industry’s opposition.  The industry then secretly funneled $86 million to 
oppose the law through the U.S. Chamber of Commerce; it was too 
unpopular a messenger to oppose the legislation itself.28  But too much 
momentum had been built up by that time for the opposition campaign to 
work. 
Strategic Lesson Three:  Let Congress Lead with Legislative Deals.  
While the Clinton Administration had spent nine months developing its 
own bill, the Obama Administration deferred to the considerable expertise 
among Democrats in Congress, as well as to their institutional pride.  By 
deferring to the congressional leadership, the White House avoided fanning 
intramural fights that would have delayed the legislation and offended 
many members of Congress.  And as Democrats had all agreed on the 
overall approach, both Houses wrote bills that were readily reconcilable. 
Strategic Lesson Four:  A Well-Organized and Funded Grassroots 
Campaign.  In the past efforts, supporters of reform did not field a well-
organized, national campaign to demonstrate grassroots support for reform 
to members of Congress.  Starting in 2007, a coalition of many of the 
largest progressive organizations in the country—including unions, 
community organizing networks, netroots, think tanks, and constituency 
groups—began to prepare for passage of health reform, contingent on a 
Democrat winning the presidency in 2008.  Launched in July 2008, with 
simultaneous press conferences in fifty-three cities in thirty-eight states, 
Health Care for America Now (HCAN) ran grassroots field campaigns in 
some forty states.29  The effort bolstered Democratic champions in 
Congress and prevailed on a critical mass of conservative Democrats to 
support the legislation.  The strategy fully proved its worth when, in 
response to the right-wing grassroots attack on reform by tea party activists 
in August of 2009, HCAN and other allied efforts rallied support for 
Democratic legislators who were being attacked.30 
HCAN also ran national TV ads that responded to the anti-government 
rhetoric of conservative opponents with a message, “If the insurance 
companies win, you lose.”31  In addition to HCAN’s $50 million, other 
major groups such as AARP and labor unions spent large sums on 
grassroots and netroots support.  It was the first time that health reform 
proponents were able to withstand the opposition campaign. 
 
 28. See Drew Armstrong, Insurers Gave U.S. Chamber $86 Million Used To Oppose 
Obama’s Health Care, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 17, 2010 4:32 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2010-11-17/insurers-gave-u-s-chamber-86-million-used-to-oppose-obama-s-health-
law.html. 
 29. See KIRSCH, supra note 3, at 65–71. 
 30. Id. at 189–212. 
 31. Id. at 225. 
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Strategic Lesson Five:  The President Needs To Move Fast and Keep 
Pushing.  President Obama took a key lesson from Lyndon Johnson, who 
pushed hard for Medicare and Medicaid early in 1965, after his landslide 
victory the previous November.  President Obama held a health care 
summit with congressional leaders and major stakeholders in March of 
2009, and by June, legislation started to move.  Most importantly, at three 
times between February 2009 and February 2010, when many of the top 
White House staff argued against pushing for comprehensive reform, 
President Obama insisted on going ahead.  He was assisted by brilliant 
legislative maneuvering by both House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Senate 
Majority Leader Harry Reid. 
III.  THE NEW POLITICAL CONTEXT FOR HEALTH REFORM 
The reelection of President Obama ushers in a new era of health care in 
the United States, an era in which the question is not whether there should 
be a government guarantee of access to affordable health coverage, but how 
that guarantee is implemented.  By all rights, the signing of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act on March 23, 2010, should have 
marked the beginning of that new era.  But the political fight continued for 
another twenty months, first through a politically charged legal challenge, 
which the Supreme Court settled in June of 2012,32 and then through the 
presidential election in November. 
With the political path clear, the federal and state governments are 
turning to the task of implementing the two central provisions aimed at 
making health coverage affordable.  The first is the establishment of the 
health care marketplaces, called “exchanges.”  States will decide whether to 
set up an exchange on their own, in partnership with the federal 
government, or cede responsibility to the Feds.  Whichever level of 
government is in charge will need to make a host of decisions on the exact 
level of benefits and the extent of regulation of insurance companies in the 
exchange.  Some will opt to allow any qualified insurer to offer its products.  
Others will limit the exchanges to insurers that meet quality standards at a 
reasonable price.  None of these decisions will be static; they will become 
the substance of political debate every year. 
The second major coverage expansion will be through the ACA’s raising 
the income eligibility for Medicaid to 133 percent of the Federal Poverty 
Level (FPL).  The Supreme Court gave states the ability to opt-out of that 
provision.  Most states are expected to comply, as the federal government 
will pay 100 percent of the cost initially, tapering down to 90 percent over 
ten years.  We can expect to see political debate over this provision in a 
handful of states for a number of years, although over time, all are likely to 
implement the expansion. 
The public will become more heavily engaged in debates about the levels 
of subsidies for purchasing coverage.  While the subsidies are large enough 
 
 32. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
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to make health insurance affordable for many low and middle income 
people, premiums will be a financial strain for some, particularly those with 
more income (subsidies are available up to 400 percent of the FPL), who 
will still be required to pay a substantial amount for coverage.  The debate 
on Congress will be whether or not to increase subsidies, while 
conservatives will push for reducing them to save the government money.  
There will be other major debates over a host of issues, including the 
responsibilities of employers to provide coverage, further regulation of 
insurance companies, and most centrally, how to control health care costs. 
The new political context will also focus public debate on systemic cost 
controls.  We can see the future by looking at what has happened in 
Massachusetts since their law was enacted.  While ObamaCare remains 
politically contentious, RomneyCare is very popular, a settled part of the 
political landscape.  It is working well:  Romney even bragged that 98 
percent of Massachusetts residents were covered in the second presidential 
debate.33 
But because the state is now responsible for more of the cost of health 
coverage, the Massachusetts legislature, with the encouragement of 
Governor Deval Patrick, has engaged in vigorous annual debates on how to 
better rein in the growth of health spending.  In 2012, the legislature passed 
a law intended to set limits on the rise in health spending.  Under pressure 
from the new law, health insurance companies and hospital systems are 
agreeing to new cost control measures.  At the same time, the people who 
run the Massachusetts Exchange have used their market clout to get insurers 
to improve quality while controlling costs.  And in liberal Massachusetts—I 
won’t predict this for Congress—there has been no serious consideration of 
cutting benefits or subsidies to people. 
We are certain to see the same accelerated debate on cost controls at the 
federal level.  The ACA establishes Accountable Care Organizations 
(ACOs) in Medicare, networks of hospitals, and doctors who integrate 
delivery with the goal of providing higher quality care at lower cost.  The 
ACOs are modeled after organizations like the Mayo Clinic and Cleveland 
Clinic, which have a track record of achieving these goals.  We can expect 
those ACOs with the best track record to become models for Medicare and 
private insurers over the next few years.  The public health insurance 
option, designed to be a competitor with private insurance to put downward 
pressure on costs, may reemerge at the state or federal level.  There will be 
renewed pressure for Medicare to negotiate prescription drug prices.  
Vermont has voted to implement a single-payer system in 2017, when the 
ACA allows states to innovate as long as they achieve the same coverage 
 
 33. See Transcript and Audio:  Second Presidential Debate, NPR (Oct. 16, 2012 11:01 
PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/10/16/163050988/transcript-obama-romney-2nd-presidential-
debate. 
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goals without increasing spending.34  And through all this, conservatives 
will continue to push for more market solutions, as the health care system 
becomes an annual part of government policy and political debate 
nationally. 
With President Obama’s reelection and the Democratic majority under 
Harry Reid in the Senate, there is no doubt that the Affordable Care Act 
will be fully implemented in 2014.  And a new era in health care, an era in 
which the right to health care is a public matter, a matter of regular, 
government policy, will finally have begun in the United States. 
 
 34. See Zaid Jilani, The Vermont Senate Passes Bill Establishing a Single Payer Health 
Care System in the Senate, THINKPROGRESS (Apr. 26, 2011 5:59 PM), http://think
progress.org/politics/2011/04/26/161413/vermont-senate-single-payer/?mobile=nc. 
